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During the 1980s and 1990s there was an intensive debate
about the reasons for the poor development in particular in
Sub-Saharan Africa, and foreign aid came under increasing
critique. This generated an abundance of research on the eﬀec-
tiveness of foreign aid. Drawing on this literature, donors
organized a series of conferences to discuss how to improve
aid practices and make aid more eﬃcient. 1 In the Paris Decla-
ration from 2005 they summarized their conclusions about
how a good aid relationship should be structured. This was
then extended in the Accra Agenda for Action of 2008 and
in the Busan Declaration of 2011. We refer to the entire set
of aid eﬀectiveness declarations by donors as the Paris
Agenda. Donor coordination is a key feature of this agenda,
and this paper discusses and quantiﬁes the implications of
two diﬀerent types of donor coordination for aid eﬀectiveness.
We ﬁrst provide estimates of the reductions in donor transac-
tion costs that can be achieved by better donor coordination
via concentration to fewer partner countries and a shift from
project aid to program-based approaches. We further present
estimates of how much could be gained in terms of poverty
reduction if donors jointly optimize aid allocation across
countries. Our paper thus focuses on the behavior of donors
and its implication for aid eﬀectiveness. The contribution of
the paper to the literature on aid eﬀectiveness is that it pro-
vides empirical estimates of the magnitudes of the eﬀects of
improved donor coordination.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we
discuss four main features of the Paris Agenda and how they
relate to our analysis. In Section 3 we identify the types of aid
which are relevant for our analysis. Section 4 presents our
empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses the implications of
our results for the four identiﬁed dimensions of the Paris
agenda and the political economy of the implementation of
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The Paris Declaration of 2005 outlined a strategy to make
aid more eﬃcient through the rationalization of donor behav-
ior. This would be achieved by measures to increase recipient
country ownership, to improve donor harmonization and
alignment with recipient policies, to manage aid according to75results, and to enhance mutual accountability. At a subse-
quent high-level meeting in Accra in 2008 donors elaborated
on these themes in the Accra Agenda for Action. This added
that one should seek to improve the predictability of aid ﬂows
and reduce conditionalities.
In 2011 there was another high-level meeting in Busan,
where participants agreed on the “Busan Partnership for Eﬀec-
tive Development Cooperation.” This document is an attempt
to adjust the aid architecture to the new realities with a more
diverse body of donors. Four shared general principles are
listed in the Busan Declaration:
(i) Ownership of development priorities by developing coun-
tries: The concept of ownership is thus still a central fea-
ture of the aid agenda, and it is one of the four key
dimensions that are focused in this paper.
(ii) Focus on results: This principle is the same as before
and emphasizes that learning from experience is impor-
tant. Under this heading one also emphasizes the
importance of alignment of aid inﬂows with recipient
priorities and policies, which is the second key dimen-
sion we focus on in this paper.
(iii) Inclusive development partnerships: In the discussion on
aid modalities the need to reduce fragmentation is
underlined. The desire to be inclusive and open up
for the new players has meant that there is less empha-
sis on harmonization than in previous declarations.
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zation is more complex, but it is no less important. It is
the third key dimension that we focus on in this paper.
(iv) Transparency and accountability: There is an even stron-
ger focus in the Busan Declaration than in the earlier
ones on the issues of transparency and accountability.
If recipient governments cannot account for the
resources that have been transferred to them, donors will
not be willing to continue transferring resources. Or they
will at least be less willing to transfer resources in general
forms, which could enhance ownership. Therefore trans-
parency is our fourth key dimension.
The most interesting attempt to measure donor quality in
recent years is the study by Birdsall and Kharas (2010), who
benchmark countries and agencies against each other. The
set of dimensions we have chosen to focus on are well in line
with those identiﬁed in their study of donor quality. Thus,
we will discuss the following four key dimensions of the Paris
Agenda, namely (i) harmonization, (ii) ownership, (iii) align-
ment, and (iv) transparency. We start with general observa-
tions about the four aspects, and in the ﬁnal section we
discuss them in relation to our evidence about the role of coor-
dination for aid eﬀectiveness.
(a) Harmonization
First, it seems obvious that harmonization should have a
cost reducing eﬀect. Aid coordination allows donor to econo-
mize on their own transaction costs, and at the same time it
reduces the amount of resources that recipients need to spend
in the aid delivery process. Still, these cost saving eﬀects are
not always self-evident. Ode´n and L. Wohlgemuth (2011, p.
7) report that for recipients such as Zambia, Kenya and Tan-
zania, the developed dialog structure has become complex,
overburdening the recipient administration. They also warn
of a tendency among donors to want to micromanage pro-
grams in the numerous consultation bodies, which have been
set up to coordinate aid interventions. Second, there are the
incentive eﬀects of donor coordination. The results of the lit-
erature suggest that the eﬀectiveness of coordination would
depend on the congruence of the goals of donors and recipi-
ents (Knack & Rahman, 2007; Torsvik, 2005).
The literature has further discussed the mechanisms by
which harmonization could reduce the risk of elite capture
(Azam & Laﬀont, 2003; Bourguignon & Platteau, 2011; Gas-
part & Platteau, 2011; Svensson, 2000, 2003). This could be
achieved if donors, by reducing the number of players in a
country, can limit the exit options available to the local coun-
terparts. If donors jointly introduce a mechanism to inform
each other about fraudulent acts committed by intermediaries,
elite capture could be contained (Platteau, 2000).
For example, Easterly (2006) points out that in a situation
where there are many donors involved, it is hard to decide
who is accountable for ineﬃciencies or corruption. It makes
it hard to allocate responsibility, which means that it is harder
to introduce corrective action.
Onemay also note that there are donors, which do not want to
harmonize (e.g., theUSand the newdonors such asChina, India,
and Brazil) as well as the new vertical or global funds, which run
their projects outside the government budget system. So it is not
clear that there is a trend toward increasing harmonization.
The huge donor evaluation of the implementation of the Paris
Declaration by Wood et al. (2011, p. xiv) concludes that the
results have been somewhat disappointing in relation to the goal
of rapidly reduced burdens in managing aid. Still, they ﬁnd that
practices have been put in place, which at least allow a betteroverviewof aid byboth donors and recipients. The report is con-
cerned by the fact that that donors are slow to change and gen-
erally very risk averse, while partner countries have increasingly
taken on the agenda. Still, harmonization is regarded as the
most successfully implemented part of the Paris Agenda.
(b) Ownership
It is important for recipient incentives that the government
can formulate its policy according to its ownpriorities.How this
is aﬀected by donor coordination is not self-evident, but it may
well be that the recipient has a stronger incentive to formulate its
position well vis-a`-vis a large cohesive group of donors than
against a group with many diﬀerent requests. It is hard to mea-
sure how changes in conditionality aﬀect aid eﬀectiveness, but it
seems reasonable to assume that aid coordination can allow for
a more eﬀective implementation of conditionalities.
There is a presumption in the literature that more general
forms of aid make it possible for recipients to have better own-
ership of the policy process. By reducing the reporting burden
and simplifying coordination of activities, it should be eﬀec-
tiveness enhancing. However, Ode´n and Wohlgemuth (2011)
voice the concern that the increased use of budget support
has meant that the dialog has become more political in nature,
which may imply a reduction in ownership. So it is not auto-
matic that a general from of aid leads to improved ownership.
Ode´n and Wohlgemuth draw the conclusion from their
review that there is weak willingness and capacity of the host
governments in Africa to take up their leadership role in the
Paris Agenda process, while at the same time there is a reduced
willingness by many donors (“Paris fatigue”) to accept delays
due to increased ownership. The progress on this dimension is
unclear (Wood et al., 2011).
(c) Alignment
There is a broad consensus that development depends fun-
damentally on the quality of policies and institutions (Hall
& Jones, 1999; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobato´n, 1999;
Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004). Besley and Persson
(2010) point to “state capacity” as the key determinant of
whether a country can achieve development. Aid is often allo-
cated to improve the quality of public institutions, but how
should interventions be designed to help build eﬀective institu-
tions rather than undercut incentives for good public gover-
nance? It seems clear that aid aﬀects growth via governance
variables, and how governance is aﬀected depends on how
aid is channeled. Projects require a lot of detailed decisions
and steering, which is a burden on the administrative systems.
More general forms of aid would make it possible to leave
more of the decision-making in the hands of the recipient,
i.e., increase ownership. It should be noted, though, that it
may be easier to control elite capture on the project level,
but it is hard to come up with empirical estimates of this.
It is likely that aid to government will have amore sustainable
impact if it is integrated within the regular government system,
even if it may increase the risk of misappropriation. Therefore,
even if an individual project may work better within parallel
structures, one must factor in what the consequences are for
the long-run functionality of the whole system of government.
(d) Transparency
The ﬁnal issue we consider is how aid coordination aﬀects
transparency in the recipient countries. It may well be that
countries have a stronger incentive to report eﬀectively to a
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course, also be easier to produce one comprehensive report
than to produce many adjusted to each donor’s individual
requests. Both these factors may thus contribute to improved
reporting and increased transparency. One of the key recom-
mendations of Wood et al. (2011) is to focus on transparency.3. WHAT KIND OF AID IS RELEVANT FOR THE PARIS
AGENDA?
Analyses of the aid eﬀectiveness implications of the Paris
Agenda (Bigsten, Tengstam, Platteau, & Aldashev, 2011; Bird-
sall & Kharas, 2010; European Commission, 2009) have
focused on country programmable aid (CPA), i.e., the part
of Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA) that is subject to
multi-year programing at the country level. According to
Development Assistance Committee (DAC)’s deﬁnition,
CPA represents a subset of ODA outﬂows. It takes as a start-
ing point data on gross ODA disbursements by recipient but
excludes spending which is: (i) inherently unpredictable
(humanitarian aid and debt relief); or (ii) entails no ﬂows to
the recipient country (administration costs, student costs,
development awareness, and research and refugee spending
in donor countries); or (iii) is usually not discussed between
the main donor agency and recipient governments (food aid,
aid from local governments, core funding to Non-Governmen-
tal Organization (NGO)s, aid through secondary agencies,
ODA equity investments, and aid which is not allocated by
country); (iv) CPA does not net out loan repayments, as these
are not usually factored into aid allocation decisions. CPA is
therefore a gross concept.
The focus of our discussion is on the coordination of CPA
aid from governments and international organizations. When
it comes to the NGOs the need for coordination is less clear-
cut, although there are instances where coordination would
be useful also here. Platteau (2003) provides the arguments
for coordination also of NGO donors, which sometimes com-
pete against each other in ineﬀective ways or allocate their
resources ineﬀectively. Still, since NGOs are not involved in
setting conditions for the recipients or channeling resources
through the public sector, it may still be less critical to coordi-
nate between them and state donors. It may even be advanta-
geous in some cases to let them operate outside the aid
coordination framework and to let them have a complemen-
tary role. They could, for example, by being part of the civil
society contribute to the pressure on governments for relevant
policy changes or accountability. One could also argue that it
may be desirable to have a variety of donors trying out diﬀer-
ent approaches. Easterly (2006) argues that one should let aid
entrepreneurs (e.g., NGOs but also others) function more
freely and independently of any large coordinated plan. It is
at least not self-evident that NGOs should come under the
Paris Agenda umbrella. To the extent that NGOs should be
coordinated, this could possibly be done under a diﬀerent
umbrella than the state-to-state aid.4. DONOR COORDINATION AND AID
EFFECTIVENESS
The Paris Agenda has a broad scope, covering both various
dimensions of how donors coordinate their actions among
themselves, and dimensions relating to how each donor inter-
acts with the recipient government. In this paper we focus on
two crucial aspects of the ﬁrst dimension. This is, ﬁrst, theissue of coordination of aid activities among the donors so
as to reduce transaction costs. The second aspect relates to
donor coordination of the allocation of aid resources across
developing countries. Can we improve poverty reduction by
a better allocation of aid resources among countries? Can
more be achieved by shifting resources from donor darlings
to donor orphans?
We include as many donor countries as possible in our analy-
sis, both DAC and nonDAC members. The DAC members are
most of the West European and North American countries, the
European Union, Australia, New Zeeland, Japan, and Korea
(Iceland and Check Republic have joined during 2013, but we
do still refer to them as nonDAC members). The datasets on
aid ﬂows from OECD/DAC include aid data for both the
DAC members and for some nonDAC members, e.g., Turkey
and United Arab Emirates (UAE). Donors such as e.g., China,
India, Brazil, and Mexico are not included in the datasets.
Thedataweuse come from the following sources:ODA, bilat-
eral ODA, and administrative costs are from OECD (2011b),
CPA is fromOECD (2011c), population,GrossDomestic Prod-
uct (GDP)/capita, and GDP/capita (Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP)) are from World Bank (2011a), and the Worldwide
Governance Indicators are from World Bank (2011b).
(a) Transaction costs (cost saving for donors)
In this section we discuss two forms of harmonization. One
can reduce aid fragmentation (having a more eﬀective division
of labor) by having fewer partner countries and by shifting
from projects to program-based approaches. We estimate
how far from the target levels the donor community is, and
we also try to measure what it costs to miss the Paris Agenda
target. We do this by estimating the extra administrative costs
that are due to aid not being harmonized.
Much of the debate about aid coordination has concerned
coordination of aid to individual countries. Since aid activities
are often complementary, donors need to coordinate to avoid
ineﬃcient aid allocations (Bigsten, 2006; Kanbur, 2006). Still,
administrative controls of aid ﬂows are important in some
instances—and in particular if aid is given to poorly governed
or corrupt countries. It is certainly not possible or appropriate
to bring the level of administration to zero, and this is not
envisaged here.
Although the optimal overhead is not zero, our estimates
give an indication about the savings that can potentially be
made on administrative costs. The focus in this section is on
the short-term or transaction costs of aid on the donor side.
Our analysis is an extension of Bigsten et al. (2011). We try
to get full coverage of all transaction costs of the donors. To
do this we start with comprehensive information from donors
on all their administrative costs and evaluate how much of this
cost could be saved by concentrating activities to fewer coun-
tries and fewer activities. We assume that the total aid budget
will not shrink, which means that the remaining activities will
be larger. We do not believe that they can grow in size without
some increase in administrative overheads. However, there are
clearly economies of scale, so the increase is not proportional
to the growth of the budget.
We study the cost savings that can be made on the adminis-
trative costs of all DAC country donors, the Czech Republic,
Turkey, and the European Commission (EC), as shown in
Table 1. 2 This means that other multilaterals plus a few smal-
ler donors are missing, but we cover about two thirds of all aid
and we cover the most relevant part. Multilaterals like the
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) are not
supposed to concentrate their aid to a few countries. Still,
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(PBA) to a larger extent, but we lack the data to estimate
potential eﬀects.
The steps in our computation of administrative savings pos-
sible for year 2009 are listed as follows:
Step 1:Weﬁrst scale down the administrative costs by reduc-
ing the number of partner countries. We estimate the
percentage reduction in administrative costs when
reducing the number of recipients, while keeping
the overall aid budget constant andwithout changing
the composition of the aid ﬂow, i.e., the mix between
projects andprograms.Tobe able todo thisweuse an
estimate of the economies of scale in aid delivery,
which we have derived earlier with the help of
regression analysis (Bigsten et al., 2011; Tengstam,
2013 3).
Step 2: We then reduce costs further by changing aid modal-
ities. We investigate how much money can be saved
by shifting money from projects to programs. This
gives an extra cost saving on top of the eﬀect of
country concentration. So we estimate the required
amount of aid that comes from bilaterals as project
support that needs to be shifted to program support
to meet the 66% target of the Paris Declaration. To
get an estimate of how large the cost savings are, we
need an estimate of the administrative cost reduc-
tions such a shift implies. One might expect that
there are also eﬀectiveness consequences of a switch
from projects to programs. The administrative costs
of recipients would probably tend to fall, while leak-
ages of resources might increase. There may also beTable 1. Gross Disbursements in 2009
Donor CPA Administrative costs
Australia 1,622.62 109.07
Austria 106.57 39.9
Belgium 514.7 94.77
Canada 1,712.07 269.62
Czech Republic 92.24 3.9
Denmark 1,342.36 161.56
European Commission 9,484.95 762.81
Finland 412.22 80.27
France 4,171.17 441.43
Germany 4,674.73 287.49
Greece 153.15 23.36
Ireland 381.5 44.85
Italy 580.96 59.43
Japan 10,568.53 723.77
Korea 526.24 27.76
Luxembourg 180.56 19.5
Netherlands 1,850.15 331.17
New Zealand 162.88 23.95
Norway 1,460.68 215.66
Portugal 240.39 18.33
Spain 2,797.12 189.57
Sweden 1,377.53 219.43
Switzerland 573.79 162.47
Turkey 614.34 51.68
United Kingdom 3,992.8 397.05
United States 15,732.11 1,354.35
Total 65,326.36 6,113.15
Note: All donors for whom there is CPA, administrative costs, bilateral ODA,
from countries (including the European Commission) in Table 5 in Appendix
country donors included in Table 5 could be included in this table. The reason
on CPA. Source: OECD (2011b), OECD (2011c).speciﬁc instances where projects should be pre-
ferred. However, we are not able to incorporate
these potential eﬀects in the estimations here.
It should furthermore be noted that technical assistance is
not included in our computations, for two reasons. First, we
can reach the 66% target by only shifting from projects to pro-
grams. Estimates in Bigsten et al. (2011) show that there is a
bigger saving from shifting from projects to programs than
shifting from technical assistance to programs based on the
price tags we have derived. Second, it is less clear that it is
as feasible to shift this type of aid into programs.
Table 1 shows the most important aid magnitudes for 2009.
The calculations of cost savings will start from the estimate of
administrative costs of US$6113 million. All donors for whom
data were available are included in this table.
Step 1 in greater detail: We ﬁrst estimate how much the
administrative costs can be reduced if donors focus on fewer
partner countries. To be able to come up with such an estimate
we need an estimate of the scope for costs savings. Bigsten
et al. (2011) and Tengstam (2013) estimate the relation
between fragmentation and administrative costs controlling
for aid volume and time dummies. Fragmentation is measured
as the number of partner countries and regions to which a
donor gives CPA, since what we are proposing is to have fewer
partner countries and regions and not, for example, to give
emergency aid, food aid, or debt relief to fewer countries
and regions. 4 The analysis covers all donor countries for
which data were available (the DAC members, 5, the Czech
Republic, Poland, and Turkey) and the EC for 2000–09.
The number of partners was on average 109.2 and had a
standard deviation of 30.5. That the average donor countryat Current Prices (Million US$)
Bilateral ODA excl. CPA and admin costs Bilateral ODA
580.09 2,311.78
373.77 520.24
1,054.25 1,663.72
1,200.11 3,181.8
4.9 101.04
437.32 1,941.24
2,775.82 13,023.58
298.61 791.1
5,234.54 9,847.14
3,397.45 8,359.67
120.43 296.94
266.85 693.2
412.55 1,052.94
1,692.46 12,984.76
61.31 615.31
65.94 266
2,775.94 4,957.26
39.16 225.99
1,491.89 3,168.23
53.47 312.19
1,886.37 4,873.06
1,416.15 3,013.11
1,024.34 1,760.6
-0.71 665.31
3,474.52 7,864.37
8,905.94 25,992.4
39,043.47 110,482.98
and ODA data in the DAC datasets are included in this table. Total CPA
, 69,378.31, diﬀers from total CPA in this table, 65,326.36, since not all
is that there are data for fewer donor countries on administrative cost than
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astonishing. Even if regional aid is not counted, and one
requires the CPA volume to be at least US$250,000, the aver-
age is as high as 74.3. The Paris Declaration does not provide
any target for how much this should be decreased, but follow-
ing the tradition in economics, we discuss the eﬀect of a reduc-
tion in the number of partner countries and regions by one
standard deviation. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of such a concentra-
tion is that the administrative costs would decrease by 14%.
Applying this 14% estimate on total administrative costs of
US$6,113.15 million (from Table 1), we get a saving of
0.14  6,113.15 = US$856 million.
Step 2 in greater detail: Once donors have focused on fewer
countries, they can change the modalities of aid. It is a challenge
to get estimates of the price tags of administration for diﬀerent
modalities. We do not have comprehensive estimates of this,
but we have information from Sida. This is a medium-sized bilat-
eral donor, which probably can be taken to be rather typical in
terms of administrative costs. 6 Sida undertook a detailed analy-
sis of its administrative costs in 2010, which was presented in its
annual report (Sida, 2011). Using that information, we can con-
clude that program aid per dollar disbursed only costs 33.5% as
much as project aid in donor administration costs. Further,
money transferred as technical assistance had a transaction cost
of 45.9% of the costs for a project. The focus in the Paris Decla-
ration is about shifting to program-based approaches from pro-
jects and technical assistance. What we simulate here is a shift
from projects to programs, while we leave technical assistance
aside. After reducing the number of recipients in step 1, the
administrative costs remaining in our main case is US$5,257 mil-
lion. We now consider how much of this can be reduced by a
shift from projects to PBA. We ﬁrst compute how much of these
costs are related to CPA, the most relevant part of aid in this
context. We ﬁnd that 77% of the administrative costs, that is
US$4,048 million, are related to CPA. See Appendix A.
The target of the Paris Agenda is to increase the share of
PBA to 66%. This could be interpreted to mean 66% of total
ODA, but in our estimate here we interpret this to mean that
66% of CPA is to go through PBA. With the broader interpre-
tation the estimate would of course be larger than what we get
here. If we increase the proportion of CPA that constitutes
PBA from the actual 2009 level of 39–66%, the CPA adminis-
trative costs related to CPA will be reduced by 24.3%. See
Appendix B. The ﬁgure 24.3% is based on our estimate that
program aid per dollar disbursed costs only 33.5% as much
as project aid in donor administration costs. That gives a cost
saving of 0.243  4048 = US$984 million.
Summing up the results of our two steps, we get a total sav-
ing on transaction costs of US$1840 million. So it seems clear
that donors could save signiﬁcant amounts of resources by
reducing aid fragmentation, but the fact that they have not
done this may be an indication that they consider the political
costs of adjusting to be too high.
It should also be noted that what we have estimated here
relates only to costs on the donor side, while lack of harmoni-
zation also has consequences for costs on the recipient side. In
our study of European aid (Bigsten et al., 2011) we attempted
to capture indirect costs of the lack of harmonization on
growth, and we did ﬁnd that there are such costs. Our esti-
mates in Bigsten et al. (2011) indicate that these eﬀects are
potentially large, but the estimates are very imprecise.
(b) Addressing the issue of aid orphans (beneﬁts for recipients)
The Paris agenda assumes that the eﬀectiveness of aid use
can be enhanced by improved allocation of resources acrosscountries. 7 To what extent has this issue been addressed,
and how much more needs to be done? We analyze this by
investigating what an “optimal” aid allocation would look like
if the aim is to achieve as large a reduction of poverty as pos-
sible. We also investigate how much more poverty reduction
could be achieved if aid was actually allocated according to
our allocation rule.
In this analysis we consider country programmable aid (CPA)
for year 2009. We include CPA both from country donors and
frommultilateral donors, but we exclude CPA given as regional
aid. This gives us a total ofUS$87,638million of aid to startwith
(Appendix Table 5 presents aggregates for CPA). US$2,185 m
of this money is from nonDAC donors included in the data-
set. The bulk of this nonDAC money comes from UAE
(US$704 m), Turkey (US$554 m), and Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait together (US$528 m). The other nonDAC donors are
Iceland, Israel, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the
SlovakRepublic, Slovenia, Thailand, and “other donor countries”
(which includes some very small donors). After excluding aid to
some countries that could not be included due to lack of data on
incomes (mainly the Palestinian Administrative Areas and
Mayotte, seeAppendixTable4),weare leftwithUS$83,958million
that donors could seek to allocate optimally. 8 One argument
for including both bilateral and multilateral CPA is that donor
countries have inﬂuence on multilateral aid indirectly.
In the analysis of optimal aid allocation, it is important to
discuss issues related to both the needs and the ability of reci-
pient countries to transform increased aid volumes into pov-
erty reduction. Therefore, when computing how much aid
should to be reallocated from darlings to orphans, we develop
the extension of Collier and Dollar (2002) presented in Bigsten
et al. (2011). We need to take into account that aid has been
found to have decreasing returns with regard to its share of
GDP. We assume that the point at which the positive impact
of aid falls to zero is when CPA/GDP (PPP) = 10%. 9
From a theoretical perspective the quality of governance
should be included in the model. But measures such as the
Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2011b) are
largely subjective, and the estimates of the impact of quality
of governance on the ability to transform aid volumes into
poverty reduction are very imprecise. Therefore, we argue that
it is preferable, ﬁrst, to derive an optimal aid allocation that
does not take the quality of governance into account, and
instead incorporate the quality of governance in a second step
when discussing this allocation and its beneﬁts and costs.
(i) The model
Following the notation in Collier and Dollar (2002), for
country i we let Ni be population, yi be GDP per capita
(PPP), Ai be aid/GDP (PPP), hi be headcount poverty, Gi be
the growth rate, and ai be the income elasticity of headcount
poverty. A is the total amount of aid. We assume that the
objective function of donors is to allocate aid among countries
so as to achieve
Max poverty reductionX
i
GiaihiN i ð1Þ
subject to
P
iAiyiN i ¼ A; Ai;  0
If we consider, to start with, only interior solutions, the ﬁrst
order conditions for a maximum are
dGi
dAi
¼ k yi
aihi
ð2Þ
where k is the shadow value of aid. Like Collier and Dollar
(2002), we assume that ai = a, i.e., that the elasticity is the
80 WORLD DEVELOPMENTsame in all countries. This is a simpliﬁcation that ignores
potential variation among countries, but we should still be
able to capture the average impact and a reasonable aggregate
estimate. 10 Assuming (as is standard in the literature, e.g.,
Collier & Dollar, 2002) a quadratic relationship between A
and G, using 10% as the saturation point, and letting g denote
dG
dA when A = 0, it follows that
dGi
dAi
¼ g 1 Ai
0:1
 
ð3Þ
Bourguignon (2000) ﬁnds an income elasticity of headcount pov-
erty (US$1 per day line) of approximately 2. He also ﬁnds that
the absolute value of the elasticity is generally smaller in poorer
countries, so we use 1 as a conservative number. This is in line
with what is found by Bigsten and Shimeles (2007). Now we can
write poverty as a function of income and a constant k.
hi ¼ ky1i ð4Þ
In our allocation model we let k be the same for all countries.
This means that we estimate an optimal allocation based on
the poverty a country “should have” based on its national
income level, not on its actual poverty level. One rationale
for this is that if a country has a high income level compared
to its poverty level, it should be more able to tackle poverty on
its own, than a country with a lower national income level and
the same poverty level. Another rationale for this is that if one
picks one poverty measure, e.g., headcount poverty, a country
might have low poverty based on this, but on the other hand
have a high need for aid due to e.g., the depth of poverty or
high infant mortality. Using GDP/capita (PPP) is more robust
than using one single poverty measure. Compared to using
e.g., Human Development Index (HDI), GDP/capita (PPP)
has the advantage that it also captures the extent to which
the country actually could handle the problem itself. There
might be severe poverty in oil rich Angola, and even some pov-
erty in the USA, but it still makes sense to consider the
national income levels in these countries when estimating
how much aid should be allocated to them.
Then (2)–(4) implies
Ai ¼ 0:1 cy2i ð5Þ
where c ¼ 0:1kgka .
Now we can derive an allocation rule. The aid allocation to
country i, Ai , should be the aid derived in (5), but obviously
aid must be nonnegative, so we now also need to consider cor-
ner solutions.
This gives:
Ai ¼ 0:1 cy2i if 0:1 cy2i > 0
Ai ¼ 0 if 0:1 cy2i 6 0
ð6Þ
We cannot use this allocation rule directly, since we cannot
solve for k analytically, and we do not know the exact values
of g and k. But since the budget condition isX
i
yiA

i N i ¼ 83958 ð7Þ
we can numerically solve for c and then use (6) as our alloca-
tion rule. Note that there is no need to solve for k, or to apply
values for a, g, or k. It is enough to solve for c to be able to
derive the optimal allocation.
(ii) Results and discussion
We deﬁne an “aid orphan” as a country that receives less aid
than our allocation rule recommends. To reduce poverty more
eﬀectively, the donor community should scale up aid to thesecountries. Table 2 shows data for all orphans, including the
increase in aid our analysis recommends. We further deﬁne
“aid darling” as a country that gets more aid than our alloca-
tion rule recommends. The donor community should scale
down aid to these countries. Table 3 shows detailed informa-
tion on the most important darlings, and aggregate informa-
tion for the rest of the darlings, including the decrease in aid
our analysis recommends.
(iii) If we do not take aid absorption capacity into account
In Tables 2 and 3 we see that as much as US$44,609 million
of aid (out of US$83,958 million) should be reallocated. The
fact that more than half of the money would have to be real-
located is alarming. One should also be concerned that there
are diﬀerences across countries in how eﬀectively the money
is used to reduce poverty. Therefore it is important to study
the relation between the cost and the beneﬁt of making such
a re-allocation.
The beneﬁt of this is US$44,609 million more to the orphans
(that end up with US$75,534 million) and the cost is that the
darlings lose US$44,609 million (ending up with US$8,424
million). This shift represents an eﬀectiveness gain in terms
of poverty reduction (decrease in the number below the pov-
erty line), since the poverty reduction eﬀect of one dollar in
the darling countries is only 16.2% of the eﬀect the same dollar
would have in the orphan countries. 11 If we use the dollars
optimally allocated as the norm, we can say that the cost is
0.162  US$44,609 million = US$7,227 million. Thus, the
net beneﬁt is US$44,609 million minus US$7,227 mil-
lion = US$37,382 million. So we conclude that the net gain
from re-allocation according to the assumptions used so far
would be US$37,382 million.(iv) If we do take aid absorption capacity into account
However, for this gain to be realized there should not be any
diﬀerence in the quality of governance between the darlings
and the orphans. But there is such a diﬀerence! In the sample
the weighted average of the quality of governance index
based on the Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank,
2011b), is lower among the orphans than among the
darlings. 12 A high index indicates strong governance perfor-
mance. The growth eﬀect of the resources shifted to the
orphans should thus on average be lower than it would have
been if the orphans had had the same quality of governance
as the darlings. To adjust for this we use a rather crude
approach. We ﬁrst separate out a re-allocation from the worst
governed darlings to the best governed orphans. We want
these two groups to contain as much aid money (that our allo-
cation rule recommends to be reallocated) as possible, and at
the same time we want the weighted average quality of gover-
nance index among the good orphans to be at least as high as
the weighted average governance index among the bad dar-
lings. As much as US$23,828 million of the missing aid in
orphan countries is in countries with a weighted average gov-
ernance index of –4.48. These are the “good orphans.”We can
also create a group of the worst darlings. We expand this
group successively until it includes at least US$23,828 million.
The weighted average governance index is then –4.67.
It turns out that the bad darlings (e.g., Indonesia, China,
Egypt, and the Philippines) contain US$24,273 million. Out
of this total, US$23 828 million can be reallocated to the
“good orphans,” which on average have a bit higher quality
of governance index. 13 When comparing the bad darlings to
the good orphans we see that: the poverty reduction eﬀect of
a dollar in the bad darling countries is 18.2% of the eﬀect
the same dollar would have in the good orphan countries.
Table 2. Aid Orphans
Population GDP/cap Actual aid 2009 Optimal aid Recom. increase Gov. index
PPP /cap /GDP Total /cap GDP Total
Million $ $ % Million $ % Million Million
Good orphans (Gov. index > 5.8, weighted average Gov. index is 4.48)
Bangladesh 162 1,286 10 0.8 1,665 94 7.3 15,217 13,552 -5.4
Kenya 40 1,428 38 2.7 1,520 95 6.7 3,787 2,268 -4.6
Uganda 33 1,105 47 4.3 1,545 88 8.0 2,893 1,347 -3.7
Tanzania 44 1,237 65 5.2 2,829 93 7.5 4,056 1,227 -1.7
Madagascar 20 912 19 2.1 381 79 8.6 1,546 1,164 -3.4
Ghana 24 1,410 65 4.6 1,544 95 6.7 2,268 723 0.8
Cameroon 20 2,002 32 1.6 633 69 3.4 1,345 712 -4.9
Cambodia 15 1,739 47 2.7 701 88 5.1 1,301 600 -4.8
Niger 15 626 25 3.9 376 59 9.4 896 520 -4.4
Burkina Faso 16 1,078 63 5.9 1,000 87 8.1 1,375 375 -1.9
Malawi 15 721 45 6.2 686 66 9.1 1,007 321 -2.0
Togo 7 772 33 4.3 218 70 9.0 461 243 -5.4
Senegal 13 1,650 73 4.5 921 92 5.5 1,147 226 -2.0
Mali 13 1,077 72 6.7 932 87 8.1 1,135 202 -2.4
Benin 9 1,369 72 5.3 647 95 6.9 848 201 -1.4
Lesotho 2 1,333 66 4.9 136 95 7.1 195 59 -0.7
Mauritania 3 1,751 74 4.2 243 87 5.0 287 44 -5.2
Gambia 2 1,285 76 5.9 130 94 7.3 160 30 -2.7
Zambia 13 1,299 93 7.2 1,204 94 7.2 1,216 12 -1.9
Sum 464 17,313 41,140 23,828
Bad orphans (Gov. index < 5.8)
Nigeria 155 2,001 11 0.5 1,657 69 3.4 10,680 9,022 -7.0
Ethiopia 83 848 35 4.2 2,919 75 8.8 6,200 3,281 -5.9
Sudan 42 2,007 23 1.1 956 68 3.4 2,894 1,938 -9.4
Nepal 29 1,049 30 2.8 866 86 8.2 2,522 1,656 -5.8
Coˆte d’Ivoire 21 1,545 38 2.4 796 94 6.1 1,984 1,189 -7.4
Chad 11 1,181 23 2.0 262 91 7.7 1,021 759 -8.6
Zimbabwe 13 898 26 2.9 329 78 8.7 976 648 -10.4
Guinea 10 951 17 1.8 175 81 8.5 816 641 -8.6
Yemen 24 2,243 17 0.8 403 40 1.8 937 534 -7.5
Pakistan 170 2,369 17 0.7 2,842 19 0.8 3,291 449 -7.2
Congo, DR 66 290 25 8.8 1,680 29 9.9 1,887 207 -10.0
Tajikistan 7 1,791 57 3.2 394 85 4.8 592 198 -6.8
Eritrea 5 527 21 4.1 109 50 9.5 255 147 -8.2
CAR 4 688 41 5.9 181 63 9.2 281 100 -7.7
Comoros 1 1,074 68 6.3 45 87 8.1 57 12 -6.5
Sum 640 13,613 34,394 20,781
All orphans 1,104 30,926 75,534 44,609
Note: Aid presented in this table is CPA. Source: Computed by authors based on OECD (2011c) and World Bank (2011a), World Bank (2011b).
INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AID 81The cost is therefore 0.182  US$23,828 million = US$4,337
million, and thus the net beneﬁt is US$23,828 million minus
US$4,337 million = US$19,491 million. So we conclude that
the net gain from re-allocation according to the assumptions
used here would be US$19,491 million.
For the remaining US$44,609 million minus US$23,828 mil-
lion = US$20,781 million, it is hard to estimate the magnitude
of the eﬀectiveness loss. The question is what the eﬀect would
be of reallocating money from good darlings to bad orphans.
We do not try to estimate the eﬀect, but we would like to highlight
that a lot of money could be transferred from rich good darlings
to bad orphans that are severely underfunded, for example Ethi-
opia (aid/GDP = 4.2%), Nepal (2.8%), or Chad (2.0%).
Of the US$20,336 million that goes to good darlings and
which we have not reallocated, US$8,915 million goes to coun-
tries with over US$6,000 GDP/cap PPP (e.g., Turkey, Tunisia,
Brazil, Malaysia, and Argentina). The cost of reallocating this
money is very low, since there is not much poverty to ﬁght in
those “rich” countries. This money should therefore be reallo-cated to some orphans. Another US$6,554 million goes to
countries with GDP/cap PPP 4000–6000 (e.g., Morocco, Sri
Lanka, and Ukraine), and one could, of course, also reallocate
those as well as the rest.
Thus, our crude estimates are twofold. First, there is
US$23,828 million minus US$4,337 million = US$19,491 mil-
lion that we assume can be transferred without loss in growth
and poverty reduction eﬀectiveness. Second, we can transfer
US$8,915 million from countries with over US$6,000 GDP/
cap PPP to bad orphans, but here we are uncertain about
the poverty reduction eﬀectiveness. And we could continue
the process of re-allocation further but then with even more
uncertainty about the poverty reduction eﬀects.
It should be noted that some of the darlings are post-conﬂict
countries such as Iraq and Lebanon. Maybe it makes sense to
give them aid, but should that not be taken from another
budget than ODA? These countries are not characterized by
extreme poverty. The same argument goes for the ex-
communist countries. We support them for reasons other than
Table 3. Aid Darlings
Population GDP/cap Actual aid 2009 Optimal aid Recom. decrease Gov. index
PPP /cap /GDP Total /cap /GDP Total
Million $ $ % Million $ % Million Million
Bad darlings (Gov. index < 2.3, weighted average Gov. index is 4.67)
Viet Nam 87 2,682 47 1.7 4,066 0 0.0 0 4,066 -3.1
Indonesia 230 3,813 14 0.4 3,323 0 0.0 0 3,323 -2.5
Afghanistan 30 1,200 177 14.8 5,285 92 7.6 2,734 2,552 -11.1
China 1,331 6,200 2 0.0 2,440 0 0.0 0 2,440 -3.1
Iraq 31 3,222 72 2.2 2,271 0 0.0 0 2,271 -9.0
Egypt 83 5,151 16 0.3 1,350 0 0.0 0 1,350 -2.6
Philippines 92 3,216 12 0.4 1,076 0 0.0 0 1,076 -2.9
Colombia 46 8,136 20 0.2 923 0 0.0 0 923 -2.3
Bolivia 10 4,013 64 1.6 634 0 0.0 0 634 -4.5
Nicaragua 6 2,398 123 5.1 705 14 0.6 81 624 -4.0
Lebanon 4 11,868 133 1.1 562 0 0.0 0 562 -4.0
Honduras 7 3,488 56 1.6 419 0 0.0 0 419 -3.4
Kazakhstan 16 10,452 20 0.2 318 0 0.0 0 318 -2.4
Guatemala 14 4,286 23 0.5 316 0 0.0 0 316 -3.5
Rest* 313 7,344 3,944 3,400
Sum 2,301 31,031 6,759 24,273
Good darlings (Gov. index > 2.3)
India 1,155 2,993 3 0.1 3,918 0 0.0 0 3,918 -1.3
Turkey 75 11,209 22 0.2 1,653 0 0.0 0 1,653 -0.1
Morocco 32 4,081 37 0.9 1,194 0 0.0 0 1,194 -1.7
South Africa 49 9,333 20 0.2 1,007 0 0.0 0 1,007 1.7
Sri Lanka 20 4,333 49 1.1 996 0 0.0 0 996
Jordan 6 5,082 150 3.0 894 0 0.0 0 894 0.2
Georgia 4 4,335 185 4.3 789 0 0.0 0 789 -0.7
Kosovo 2 5,969 412 6.9 744 0 0.0 0 744 -2.2
Tunisia 10 7,512 59 0.8 617 0 0.0 0 617 -0.3
Ukraine 46 5,737 13 0.2 608 0 0.0 0 608
Serbia 7 9,967 79 0.8 582 0 0.0 0 582 -1.0
Armenia 3 4,794 180 3.8 556 0 0.0 0 556 -1.3
Peru 29 7,836 18 0.2 539 0 0.0 0 539 -1.8
Brazil 194 9,414 3 0.0 488 0 0.0 0 488 0.8
Mongolia 3 3,198 146 4.6 389 0 0.0 0 389 -2.0
Bosnia-Herz. 4 7,266 102 1.4 385 0 0.0 0 385 -2.0
Albania 3 7,449 108 1.4 340 0 0.0 0 340 -0.7
Namibia 2 5,821 153 2.6 332 0 0.0 0 332 1.9
Rest* 344 5,972 1,665 4,307
Sum 1,989 22,001 1,665 20,336
All darlings 4,291 53,032 8,424 44,609
*Detailed data for aid darlings from which donors should reallocate more than US$300 m are shown. Data for the other aid darlings are aggregated in
“Rest.” Note: Aid presented in this table is CPA. Source: Computed by authors based on OECD (2011c) and World Bank (2011a), World Bank (2011b).
82 WORLD DEVELOPMENTto ﬁght extreme poverty. So what we have tried to do is to
measure how much could be gained if all donors were con-
cerned only with aggregate poverty reduction and completely
ignored political costs of coordination. In this experiment we
consider only country programmable aid. It is clear that aid
after re-allocation would be concentrated in fewer countries.
The re-allocation would lead to a modest increase of poverty
among the donor darlings and a large decline in poverty in
the orphan countries. Clearly our estimates must be seen as
an upper limit as to what can be achieved.5. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS
We have presented new empirical evidence on the poten-
tial eﬀectiveness gains of two forms of aid coordination.These were the gains from reduced fragmentation of aid
of US$1840 million and gains from coordinated allocation
across countries of US$19,491 million for the case when
we reallocate only between countries with equal quality of
governance.
We started this paper by identifying four key dimensions of
the Paris Agenda, namely (i) harmonization, (ii) ownership,
(iii) alignment, and (iv) transparency. We now conclude by a
discussion of the relevance of our results for these aspects,
as well as their political feasibility.
With regard to harmonization we ﬁnd that major cost sav-
ings can be achieved if donors concentrate their aid eﬀorts
on fewer countries and focus on more general forms of
aid transfers, such as general budget support. There may
be political constraints on such a change, since it would
mean that major donors would have to abandon certain
countries, while they may feel that they have a political
Table A1. Recipient Countries Not Included in the Analysis of Aid Orphans
in Section 4(b)
Country CPA, 2009, million US$
Palestinian administered areas 2,204.6
Mayotte 549.11
Myanmar 180.18
Somalia 175.61
Suriname 157.1
Territory of Wallis and Futuna Islands 118.28
Cuba 79.13
Montserrat 44.13
St. Vincent and Grenadines 35.25
St. Helena 30.89
Korea, Dem. Rep. 25.99
Nauru 23.27
Tuvalu 17.09
States ex-Yugoslavia 10.9
Tokelau 9.72
Niue 9
Cook Islands 8.36
Anguilla 1.62
Total 3,680.23
Note: These countries could not be included since they lack data for both
GDP/cap and GDP/cap (PPP). Source: OECD (2011c)
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general forms of assistance may be politically easier, but
donors are reluctant to go for general forms of aid when
they are uncertain about recipients’ quality of governance
or their transparency. Major gains in terms of poverty
reduction can also be achieved if donors coordinate their
aid allocation across countries. But such a coordination of
allocation would mean that countries would have to aban-
don some partner countries with which they would like to
maintain links, which makes it hard to ﬁnd political support
in the major donors for such a move.
Two closely related dimensions of reform are ownership and
alignment. Donor coordination and more general forms of aid
should make alignment easier and lead to increased owner-
ship. There is at least a presumption that this could lead to fas-
ter economic growth and thus more rapid poverty reduction.
We furthermore may note that transparency is required if
donors are to be willing to shift to more general forms of
aid, which would mean a higher degree of ownership. What
is required is, ﬁrst and foremost, that the budget process is
transparent so that the ﬂow of funds through the government
can be followed. It is clear that this is important for the eﬀec-
tive functioning of government, but there is little evidence as
to how donor coordination aﬀects this. This would depend
on how donor coordination aﬀects the incentives on the reci-
pient side.Table A2. CPA 200
Recipient
Countries (incl. the European Commission)
Countries 61,772
Regions 7,606.31
Total 69,378.31
Note: All donors for whom there are CPA data in the DAC dataset are includ
Commission) in this table, 69,378.31, diﬀers from total CPA in Table 1, 65,326
Table 1. The reason is that there are data for fewer donor countries on adminMost of these conclusions are rather uncontroversial, but
there has been little movement of donor choices in this
direction. Why? To answer this question, we need to think
about how the issue of coordination looks from the perspec-
tive of donors (Bigsten et al., 2011). Aid coordination eﬀorts
may reduce donor transaction costs and increase the possi-
bilities of achieving donor objectives in recipient countries
(e.g., poverty reduction), but it will also have political costs
in so far as the donor loses some political control of aid
transfers. So donors will weigh the importance of political
inﬂuence against poverty reduction eﬀectiveness. Larger
countries put greater weight on their political inﬂuence than
smaller ones, partly because they pursue international strat-
egies but also because they have the required clout to be
able to assert their inﬂuence.
One must ask why the actual allocation is far from the
“optimal” poverty reducing allocation. Obviously donors
have other aims apart from maximized alleviation of global
poverty. They want to be present in a broader range of
countries for economic and political reasons, and this
means that there are political constraints on the re-alloca-
tion our analysis suggests. Therefore, the extent of coordi-
nation will depend on the political goals of the
participating countries.
Donor coordination can be organized in diﬀerent ways.
Either donor countries could channel more of their aid
through some multilateral channel(s) the EC or they could
accept tighter coordination of such an organization. Even if
a reduction in transaction costs would be easier within one
structure, it would be a radical change politically to channel
much more of aid through multinational channels. So what
can be achieved in the short-term is probably a strengthening
of the processes of joint programing and policy coordination.
One popular idea among donors is that one must have “cor-
ruption free aid,” but this is not without problems. If only pro-
jects are pursued, where there is no risk of corruption, it may
well be that only the projects which are unrelated or insulated
from to the local context are chosen. This is certainly not what
the Paris Agenda argues for and it may mean that aid eﬀects
are not sustainable. The harder the donor pushes for this,
the less likely it is that the Paris Agenda will be actively pur-
sued.
It is clearly the case that donors should be willing to take
some risk in the aid processes and possibly to coordinate
their activities to manage these risks. It is not desirable
for donors to hold back on the implementation of reforms
because they are risky, if one is convinced that they lead
to better outcomes for the recipients in the long run. It
should be possible to admit that interventions have failed,
but according to the current perception one risks undermin-
ing aid support if one admits failure. There is a need for a
more serious management of risks, and it should involve
recipient governments as well.9, Million US$
Donor
Multilateral (excl. the European Commission) All donors
25,866.06 87,638.06
1,832.58 9,438.89
27,698.64 97,076.95
ed in this table. Total CPA from country donors (including the European
.36, since not all country donors included in this table could be included in
istrative cost than on CPA. Source: OECD (2011c).
84 WORLD DEVELOPMENTNOTES1. By aid eﬀectiveness we mean that aid is eﬀective in terms of achieving
good development outcomes (higher incomes, reduced poverty, and social
improvements) in the recipient countries relative to the resources spent.
2. We also included those new donors which had reported data (the
Czech Republic, Korea, and Turkey). We have had to exclude Arab
countries, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Thailand, and Chinese Taipei and some small donors, since they do not
report administrative costs. They have a total bilateral ODA of US$4,974
million.
3. Tengstam (2013) updates the estimates of Bigsten et al. (2011).
4. They also do an analysis of the eﬀect of the number of links between
donors and sector in countries, to check whether there is more information
in the links to sectors over and above what was picked up in their ﬁrst
regressions. As it turns out there are no added eﬀects of including this
dimension.
5. By DAC member we refer to the members as of January 1, 2013.
6. Easterly and Pfutze (2008) collect information from donors about
administrative costs. Their estimates indicate that there is a huge variation
across countries and multilaterals. The average for bilaterals is 7%. It is
noteworthy that the share of administrative costs in their sample of 21
countries is close to our own estimate for Sida.
7. Developing and donor countries stated in the Accra Agenda for
Action that that “we will work to address the issue of countries that
receive insuﬃcient aid” (AAA: Point 17d).
8. Six recipients had missing values for 2009 for GDP/cap (PPP) but did
at the same time not have missing values for GDP/cap. For these countries
we assigned GDP/cap (PPP) = 2  GDP/cap. For ﬁve of the countries,
Barbados, Kosovo, Marshall Islands, Oman, and Palau, their GDP/cap
were over 2500 USD and their optimal aid level would be zero for any
reasonable factor used (we, as stated, used the factor two). For the sixth
country, Zimbabwe, GDP/cap was 449 USD, and we consequently
assigned GDP/cap (PPP) the value 898 USD (PPP).
9. This level is based on the average estimate of 30% for all aid in
nominal dollars in the studies surveyed by Clemens and Radelet (2003).
This estimate is ﬁrst scaled down to 20%, since we only consider CPA and
not all aid. It is then scaled down further to 10%, since we use PPP-ﬁgures
for GDP/capita. We use PPP-adjusted ﬁgures, since we let poverty be a
function of GDP/capita, see expression (4). This simpliﬁcation should bemore accurate when using PPP-ﬁgures than nominal ﬁgures.As a
sensitivity analysis we test one lower saturation point, 7%, and one
higher, 13%. The results are presented in detail in Tengstam (2013), but the
overall conclusion is that with the lower (higher) saturation point 3% less
(3% more) aid should be reallocated if not taking aid absorption capacity
into account. The net beneﬁt is 5% lower (8% higher). How much that
should be reallocated from each darling is almost unaﬀected by the choice
of saturation point, since these are mostly countries that are not very poor,
and the optimal aid level for them is zero for any reasonable saturation
point. On the orphan side the saturation point matters more for how much
more aid each orphan should get. With the lower (higher) saturation point
less (more) aid should go to the poorest orphans, and more (less) to the
not so poor orphans. For e.g., Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Ghana, and
Niger the recommended increase is halved (raised by one third). Since
many of these not so poor orphans, e.g., Pakistan, Nigeria, and
Uzbekistan, score badly on the quality of governance index, 22% less
(34% more) aid can be reallocated from bad darlings to good orphans if
taking aid absorption capacity into account with the lower (higher)
saturation point. The net beneﬁt would be 20% lower (32% higher).
10. See, for example, Bigsten and Shimeles (2007) on variation of the
elasticity across African countries. Assuming the elasticity being the same
for all countries should have a modest eﬀect on our aggregated estimates,
but a larger eﬀect on the estimates for individual countries. But using
estimates for elasticities for countries also has its drawbacks. The variation
of the income elasticity of poverty across countries might depend very
much on which poverty measure is used. If a country has high elasticity
based on headcount one-dollar-a-day-poverty, but low elasticity based on
headcount two-dollar-a-day-poverty, or based on depth of poverty, it is
not obvious that that country should have a high weight when reallocating
aid money.
11. This is calculated using Eqns. (3) and (4).
12. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project studies six
dimensions of governance (World Bank, 2011b). For each dimension a
governance indicator is estimated. We use the sum of the six indicators as
a governance index. The weighted average of the governance index within
a group of partner countries is weighted using the amount of aid that
should be reallocated as weights. Five recipients, Sri Lanka, Ukraine,
Belarus, Montenegro, and Libya, with a combined aid of US$1,794m to
potentially reallocate, had missing values for 2009 in the dataset. All of
those were darlings. To make a conservative estimate of the potential gain
from reallocating aid we assumed them to be “good darlings.”
13. US$24,273 million minus US$23,828 million = US$445 million is
the sum not transferred to good orphans.
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We assume that the administrative cost of multilateral ODA
is relatively small and can be ignored here. Further we assume
that the administrative cost of CPA is twice as high as the
administrative cost of bilateral ODA that is not included in
CPA. In 2009 the size of CPA was US$65,326 million and
the size of bilateral ODA neither CPA nor administrative cost)
was US$39,043 million. (The numbers are from Table 1.)
Now we can calculate the proportion of the administrative
cost that is related to CPA. Let x be the administrative cost
percentage for CPA. Then the admin cost for rest bilateral
ODA (bilateral ODA not CPA and not admin cost) is 0.5x.
Total administrative cost = 65,326x + 39,043  0.5x =
84,848x. We now can conclude that the proportion of the
admin cost that is related to CPA is 65,326x/
84,848x = 77.0%. (Note that x cancels out.) This proportion
would be 71.5% (80.7%) if instead assuming that the adminis-
trative cost of CPA is 50% (150%) as high as the administra-
tive cost of bilateral ODA that is not included in CPAAPPENDIX B
OECD (2011a: Table B9) reports PBA as share of CPA by
donor. We use these shares to construct a weighted average
for the donors we study (due to missing data Greece, Poland,
and the Czech Republic were not included when calculating
this average). CPA for 2009 is used as weights. This way
PBA/CPA is found to have been 39% in 2009. The best case
scenario would be that all aid was PBA. We use this as bench-
mark. We further know that the administrative cost for non-
PBA aid is 299% of the administrative cost for PBA aid
(299% = 1/0.335). The ﬁgure 33.5% is from Sida (2011). This
tells us that the administrative costs in 2009 were
(0.39  100% + 0.61  299% =) 221.39% of benchmark. If
the target in Indicator 9 which states that 66% of aid ﬂows
should be PBA was reached, the administrative costs would
be (0.66  100% + 0.34  299%) = 167.66% of benchmark.
We now can conclude that the proportion of the administra-
tive costs related to CPA that would be saved is 53.73% of
benchmark/221.39% of benchmark = 24.3%. (Note that
“benchmark” cancels out.)ScienceDirect
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